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TOM GINSBURG*
Studying Japanese Law Because It’s There
John Haley’s essay offers a number of reasons why the study of
Japanese law is as relevant as ever.  This reply extends and, in part,
challenges Haley’s claims, focusing especially on the relevance of Jap-
anese experience for questions of institutional development and
change. The reply also emphasizes non-instrumental rationales for the
study of foreign legal systems.
Comparativists are a defensive lot, accustomed to justifying our
field to colleagues and students who do not fully understand what we
do.  The core question, “Why Compare?” is the starting point for
many a course and many a casebook in comparative law.  In his short
but sweeping essay, John Haley re-asks the classic question in the
context of Japan. As prominent scholars of Japanese law now reach
out to study China and other neighboring countries, Haley’s question
seems particularly timely.1  His answer is provocative and challeng-
ing, and with luck will advance a fresh set of work on issues for which
Japan should be of great interest.  It is hardly my place to disagree
that the study of Japanese law is important and can help generate
insights into questions of broader theoretical interest. My purpose in
this reply is to extend, supplement, and in some places challenge
Haley’s claims.
Before turning to Haley’s essay in particular, I should state at
the outset that I sometimes find the comparativist’s handwringing to
be overwrought. The study of law is a practical discipline, but it is
also an academic one and academic inquiry by its nature involves a
certain responsibility to follow one’s interests regardless of “payoff.”
To say that Japanese, or German, or Chinese law are worth studying
because those jurisdictions are large and important is to imply that
* Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to J. Mark Ramseyer
and Mathias Reimann for helpful suggestions.
1. See e.g., Frank Upham, Who will Fine the Defendant if He stays with his
Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE L. J. 1675 (2005); Benjamin Liebman &
Curtis Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Markets, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 929 (2009); Veronica Taylor, Contract and Contract Enforcement in Indonesia:
An Institutional Assessment, in INDONESIAN LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed., Timothy Lind-
sey ed., 2008) (Indonesia); David Johnson, The Prosecution of Corruption in Korea, in
LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004).
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the study of, say, Tibet, Fiji or Mongolia is unimportant.2  But knowl-
edge, it has been said, is “capable of being its own end”3 and this is as
true in law as in literature.  One can unapologetically study a foreign
legal system simply for its own sake.  Even if one starts with a more
instrumentalist premise, we cannot conceivably know whether any
particular legal rule or institution will be of broader theoretical or
practical interest until we know what it is we are looking at.  And
this requires a certain degree of local knowledge, of willingness to
understand legal systems on their own terms. There is therefore vir-
tue in having a group of scholars studying foreign legal systems for
their own sake, independent of the need to resolve any particular the-
oretical or practical question.
I.
In the four decades since Charles Stevens’ 1971 paper, Japan has
gone from a rapidly re-industrializing nation to “Number One”; it
then experienced a “lost decade” that brought it back to earth.4
When Japan was Number One, Haley’s question might have seemed
superfluous.  Scholars flocked to the study of modern Japan to under-
stand the keys to its success, eager to offer prescriptions to the rest of
us.  From political economy to policing to punishment, Japan had
something to offer.5  Though law had been underemphasized in many
of the studies on political economy, Haley and other lawyers had
brought it to the fore.6
Today, Haley is certainly right that the dominant perception of
Japan—both at home and abroad—is as a fading or stagnant society.
The economy is flat. Tokyo’s parks are now populated by homeless
men, who sleep on cardboard and rely on public services. Unemploy-
ment is on the rise, but the limited lateral hiring market mentioned
by Haley ensures that the newly unemployed have few options. The
society is aging rapidly, and yet seems unable to contemplate the ex-
2. REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE (1995) (Tibet); Yash Ghai, A
Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics in Fiji, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 639
(2007); Tom Ginsburg, The Transformation of Legal Institutions in Mongolia 1990-93,
12 ISSUES AND STUDIES 77 (1994).
3. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY (1858).
4. EZRA VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE (1979). Stevens’paper is Charles Stevens,
Modern Japanese Law  as an Instrument of Comparison, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 665
(1971).
5. CHALMERS JOHNSON ET AL., POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1991) (industrial pol-
icy); DAVID H. BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER (1991) (policing); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME,
SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (punishment);  Derek Bok, The President’s Report
to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University for 1981-1982, reprinted in 33 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 570 (1983) (arguing that the United States allocates too much talent to law
rather than engineering, in contrast with Japan).
6. JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER (1991); Frank Upham, The Place
of Japanese Legal Studies in American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV 639
(1997).
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pansion in immigration needed to deal with its demographic decline.
A long malaise seems to have set in, both in reality and in academic
perception.
And yet Japan is still—and will remain—a highly successful so-
ciety by virtually any measure. It remains the world’s second largest
economy in nominal terms.  Haley argues that we have much to learn
from the experience of Japan, for it has much to offer on core ques-
tions of economic and social policy.
I want to elaborate on some of the issues raised by Haley, focus-
ing particularly on what Japan has to tell us about questions of
institutional change and development.  The real innovations of Japa-
nese law, in my view, are institutional and organizational rather
than substantive.  The fact is that most advanced industrial societies
have fairly similar rules with regard to the economy. Where they dif-
fer is in organizational structure. In the final section of the paper, I
consider other reasons for the study of Japanese law, including those
that are decidedly non-instrumental.  We ought to study Japan, I con-
clude, because it is there.
II.
The Meiji era remains distinctive in world-historical perspective,
and Haley is surely right to suggest that a comprehensive examina-
tion from the perspective of law and development would be most
interesting.  The three decades after the Meiji Restoration of 1868
provide the single greatest story of rapid industrialization and insti-
tutional transformation that we know of, with only the postwar rise
of Northeast Asia and the ongoing transformation of post-Deng China
to compare. Historians have long debated the role of prior conditions,
policy choices, and institutions in the Meiji story, and many of the
questions remain controversial.  Revisiting these issues would be
worthwhile. To be sure, we have a number of excellent legal histories
of Meiji Japan.7  What is missing, however, is a sustained examina-
tion of Meiji legal institutions—and their predecessors in the Edo
era—from the perspective of modern institutional theory.  What were
the relative roles of political stability, quality legal institutions, and
substantive law in underpinning the Meiji transformation?  Is there
anything to learn from the sequencing of the Meiji reforms, in which
legal institutions were created first, followed by a constitution and
7. KICHISABURO NAKAMURA, THE FORMATION OF MODEN JAPAN: AS VIEWED FROM
LEGAL HISTORY (1962); JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA 13 (William Cham-
bliss trans., Ryosuke Ishii ed., 1958); PAUL HENG-CHAO CH’EN, THE FORMATION OF THE
EARLY MEIJI LEGAL ORDER (1981); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The
Development of Japanese Law 1868-1961, in Law IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963); YOSHIHIKO KAWAGUCHI, NIHON
KINDAI HOˆ SEISHI [A HISTORY OF MODERN JAPANESE LAW] (1998); EINOSUKE
YAMANAKA, SHIN-KINDAI HOˆRON [NEW DISCOURSE ON LAW IN MODERN JAPAN] (2002).
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then codes?  In contemporary state-building it is the constitution that
comes first, but it is not clear that this is everywhere and always the
most sound strategy.
In terms of the role of law in development, contemporary theory
emphasizes the role of property rights and contract enforcement.
Haley asserts that property rights and systems of enforcing contracts
were in place in Japan by the middle of the nineteenth century.8
More detail about the evolution of these systems, including the inter-
action of formal and informal mechanisms, would help inform
contemporary debates.9 Some have argued that the essential role for
the state may be the delineation of property, for informal institutions
can substitute for state enforcement of contracts,10  including those
about the relative importance of property and contract. But we also
know that the Meiji reforms involved a process of overturning some
prior entitlements, namely those of the regional rulers known as dai-
myoˆ. The government converted these entitlements into government
bonds, and also removed class privileges associated with the samurai
status entirely. This implies that reform was a dynamic story and not
merely a matter of stabilizing property rights and then letting the
market do all the work.  Interference with both property rights and
social class was an important precondition for the Meiji
transformation.
Japan’s nineteenth century transformation is also relevant to un-
derstanding the role of authoritarian rule in development, and might
provide insights understanding some of the dynamics of contempo-
rary China.11  The development of judicial independence in Japan
provides an example.  Despite billions of dollars spent on law and de-
velopment activity in recent decades in both dictatorships and
democracies, we have relatively little understanding of the dynamics
of developing judicial independence.  Japan’s experience in this re-
gard is remarkable in comparative terms.  Japan is the only case of
genuine judicial autonomy being manufactured, without colonialism,
in such a short time.
A word is in order on this point, given the substantial debate on
judicial independence in postwar Japan, pitting Haley against
Harvard Professor J. Mark Ramseyer.12  Haley has argued that “the
Japanese judiciary enjoys a greater degree of independence from po-
litical intrusion than in any other industrial democracy, both with
8. John O. Haley, Why Study Japanese Law?, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2010).
9. Perhaps the only work grappling with these questions from an institutional
perspective may be J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY (1996).
10. See e.g., Donald Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis:
The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003).
11. Peter R. Moody, Jr., Genro Rule in China and Japan: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 12 JOURNAL OF CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE 29 (2007).
12. Frank Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the
Japanese Judiciary, 30 L. SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005).
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respect to individual cases as well as the composition of the judici-
ary.”13 He has pointed out that Japanese judges are seen as being
free from corruption so prevalent elsewhere in the region.14  Ram-
seyer, with various co-authors, has demonstrated that the Japanese
Supreme Court Secretariat manipulates career incentives to punish
judges with radical views, or who oppose policies central to the re-
gime.15  Both scholars have provided convincing evidence, but the
debate concerns what might be called the right tail of the distribution
of cases.  That is, the vast majority of ordinary cases do not involve
political matters or issues salient to the governing elite.  For these
ordinary cases, both scholars agree that justice in the postwar era
was fairly uniform and of high quality.  It was likely true in the pre-
war Meiji period, though we do not have the same depth of evidence.
In both periods, judicial quality and autonomy over some cases was a
desirable policy outcome for Japan’s rulers, for it allowed them to
make credible commitments and thereby underpinned the market
economy.  How this came to be is an important and under-studied
question.
Before Shimpei Eto’s reforms of 1872, the notion of a distinct
branch of government for judicial affairs seemed, to use the most ap-
propriate term, foreign.  The development of the modern judiciary
began as a signal to foreigners that Japan was a “modern” nation, so
as to revise the Unequal Treaties that had been imposed on Japan.
Within two and a half decades, a judicial profession had been created
and judges had developed enough sense of professional autonomy to
resist executive pressure from an authoritarian government in the
famed incident at Oˆtsu in 1891.  This occurred when a policeman at-
tempted to kill the Russian crown prince.  Ordinarily, attempted
murder was punishable only by life in prison, but the government
sought the death penalty, by analogy to offenses against the Japa-
13. John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy,
and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 114 (Daniel H. Foote ed.,
2007). See also John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. D. R. 121, 139 (2002) (“By nearly all accounts, Japan’s judges
are collectively the most politically autonomous and individually the most honest in
the world, as well as among the most trusted.”).
14. John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, supra note
13 (two judges disciplined for minor infractions).
15. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Con-
servative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331, 331 (2001);
J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 126 (2003); J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCIS
MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 178 (1993) (arguing that
“Japanese judges are agents of LDP principals”). Ramseyer and Rasmusen do not find
bias in the run of the mill tax cases.  J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the
Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses,  72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999). Nor are judges de-
moted for acquittal in ordinary criminal cases. J Mark Ramseyer & Eric. B.
Rasmusen, Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53
(2001).
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nese imperial household.  Resisting this pressure, the courts
demonstrated some autonomy under the leadership of Supreme
Court Justice Kojima Iken, and established the principle of judicial
independence in the Japanese context.  This ruling became a well-
spring for the traditions of institutional autonomy and freedom from
pressures which remain the hallmark of the Japanese judiciary.
To be sure, this account of the Oˆtsu incident is not universally
accepted.  Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, in their provocative revisionist
account of imperial Japan, argue that in fact the judges were subject
to pressures from the Meiji oligarchs.16  They note that Kojima was
prosecuted for gambling after the incident, and that he retired
shortly thereafter for mysterious reasons.  They also point to evi-
dence that many judges were removed, through early retirements,
from the bench in the late 1890s.  Ramseyer and Rosenbluth’s inter-
pretation, however, is not fully convincing.  Kojima won his trial for
gambling and two other judges were able to successfully refuse trans-
fer orders, belying expected outcomes of a system of crude
punishment.17 There is also a tension in Ramseyer and Rosenbluth’s
overall story of Meiji Japan, which focuses on the inability of the Me-
iji oligarchs to act collectively, and the idea that the oligarchs were
able to act collectively to discipline judges.18
A final point about the Oˆtsu incident is that Japanese judges
themselves have interpreted it as a sign of their institutional auton-
omy.  This could, of course, be ideological obfuscation, but the
counter-image of judges acting in accordance with the short-term po-
litical preferences of governors does not seem to comport with judges’
own understanding of their role.  While Ramseyer’s evidence of ca-
reer punishment for postwar Japanese judges in “right-tail” cases is
convincing, its impact on ordinary cases is likely to be minimal.  One
need only look at the problems of judiciaries in other countries to re-
alize how unusual it is to have built an institution with strong
corporate identity, efficient operations, and institutionalized mecha-
nisms for deciding cases in a uniform manner.
In short, the creation of modern legal institutions in a period of
two decades during the Meiji era is a remarkable and important
16. J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES M. ROSENBLUTH, THE POLITICS OF OLIGARCHY:
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN IMPERIAL JAPAN (1997).
17. Id. at 77-78.
18. Indeed, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth concede that judicial autonomy was
greater than that of bureaucrats. Id. at 169-70. To be sure, many judges were retired
in the late 1890s, but as Ramseyer and Rosenbluth recount, there were good reasons
to do so from the point of view of ensuring judicial quality.  The judges in question,
too, were essentially bribed off their courts rather than summarily fired in violation of
the law.  This illustrates rather than undermines the idea of the semi-autonomous
nature of the judiciary and the institutionalization of the legal system: had the politi-
cal principals been better able to influence the judges, we would not see the retirees
leave with such a share of the “surplus.”
\\server05\productn\C\COM\58-1\COM101.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-NOV-09 8:46
2010] STUDYING JAPANESE LAW BECAUSE IT’S THERE 21
achievement and deserves more attention in light of contemporary
concerns.  Although the initial motivation for creating the Japanese
judiciary may have largely been symbolic, designed to satisfy foreign-
ers that Japanese justice was not barbaric, it led to genuine
institutional autonomy over some matters rather quickly.  Under-
standing how the early leaders of the judiciary overcame their
collective action problems to institutionalize judicial independence
bears further inquiry and might have implications for judicial reform
in other countries. Perhaps the creation of institutions from scratch
is, counter-intuitively, easier than institutional transformation,
which is the situation in most developing countries.  But the Meiji
experience suggests that a level of genuine judicial autonomy over
many cases is at least one possible outcome of the current reform pro-
grams in places like China, even under authoritarian rule.
The contemporary Japanese legal system also has the potential
to contribute to our understanding of institutional change.  The long
history of Japanese law is one of punctuated equilibrium, with major
bursts of activity in the late nineteenth century and the era after
World War II. In the last decade, Japan has witnessed another great
round of legal reform, the effects of which will be felt for some time.19
These reforms include: an expansion in the size of the bar that is
quite significant in relative, if not absolute, terms; a new graduate
system of legal education; a “sai-banin” system of lay participation in
serious criminal trials; major reforms to corporate, commercial and
administrative law, and; the rise of large law firms.  These reforms
each call out for empirical study. At a higher level of abstraction, the
reform process is itself worth examining in comparative perspective.
Many, though not all, of the reforms were mapped out in the 2001
final report of the Justice System Reform Council.20  How the process
has played out has involved complex and interesting politics worthy
of further systematic analysis and might have potential to inform
broader theories of institutional change.  It is interesting, for exam-
ple, that many of the reforms were adopted without a clear political
constituency and without external shock comparable to the Meiji and
postwar periods.  More evolutionary models of institutional change
may be applicable to this case.21
The possibility of such institutional changes provides a challenge
to one of Haley’s claims, namely that cultural patterns founded in
wet rice agriculture have had lingering social and cultural residues in
the form of communitarian social structures.22  The claim is that pat-
terns of private ordering established in village Japan have lingering
19. LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, supra note 13.
20. Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a Justice System
to Support Japan in the 21st Century (June 12, 2001).
21. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME (2004).
22. Compare KARL WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM (1957).
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effects today. This claim is hard to assess and to falsify. Haley con-
trasts it with the Chinese system, in which meritocratic
examinations provided routes of escape from the village and entry
into the elite (though one might counter-argue that the Chinese sys-
tem was more open in theory than in practice). Certainly, Haley’s
position challenges the old view of modernization theory that the Jap-
anese village mentality is a constraint rather than a facilitator of
development.23  For Haley, collectivism is a grand factor explaining
much of Japanese law as well as political economy.
Certainly no one who has worked in a Japanese institution can
deny that there are distinct patterns of social organization that re-
flect culture.  But the presence of dramatic institutional and social
changes makes assertions of lingering effects of village life difficult to
evaluate.  Take the Japanese firm, which has long been analogized to
the village.24  While many firms do assert that they take care of labor
as their primary goal, a far larger percentage claim that shareholders
are of primary importance.25  The labor market, which is central to
Haley’s understanding of how institutions operate, has been in tran-
sition. Haley pivots much of his argument on the immobility of the
mid-career labor market.  Yet the rigid labor market has not always
been a feature of Japanese economic life—prewar labor mobility was
relatively fluid.26 And the postwar system too has changed fairly dra-
matically, so that mid-career job changes are no longer quite so rare.
Seniority systems are being eroded by the rise of merit-based com-
pensation.27  The entry of foreign firms combined with rising
bankruptcy rates has meant that there is both new demand and new
supply of mid-career workers.  Some firms have moved to more porta-
ble pensions, which allow workers to take their pension investments
with them if they leave the company.  And a growing category of
“non-regular” workers on short term contracts now constitute one-
third of the labor force.28  If institutions are explained as an outcome
of collectivist values, then either those values are finally eroding af-
ter surviving major earlier shocks, or perhaps were never as
consequential for institutions as we might imagine.  Assertions of the
influence of longstanding patterns require, at a very minimum, the
stipulation of a mechanism by which some patterns remained stable
23. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN
JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 41.
24. Tadao Kogano & Takao Kobayashi, The Provision of Resources and Barriers to
Entry, in BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: VIEWS OF LEADING JAPANESE ECONOMISTS
89, 90 (Kenichi Imai ed., 1994).
25. Economist, Special Report on Business in Japan, Dec. 1, 2007.
26. Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and
Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 11,
30 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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while others changed radically.  It seems unlikely that we will be able
to identify such influences with much rigor given the current state of
social science.
III.
We compare in part to learn lessons we might apply at home.
One version of the method involves looking at societies that are simi-
lar to ours along some dimensions and to see if there are institutions
that might inform our own reform efforts.  In some cases, the lessons
we might draw from Japanese institutions might be such as to under-
mine the surface image of success.  Consider health care. J. Mark
Ramseyer has begun to turn his considerable skills to the health care
system, showing in one paper that Japanese seem to live long despite
their health care system, not because of it.29  Robert Leflar docu-
ments the relatively weak systems of accountability for preventable
medical error and the interesting use of criminal sanctions for severe
cases of negligence.30  Eric Feldman argues that declining trust in
medical expertise is fueling a rise in malpractice litigation.31 In
short, Japanese health law bears examination, though it may offer
lessons more negative than positive.
In other cases, we might use the Japanese materials to develop
broader points about the functioning of law itself.  Haley’s account of
the didactic role of law in signaling dominant understandings is a
generalizable one consistent with recent theoretical work on law’s im-
pact.32  Law is usually considered to be a formal mechanism,
contrasted with informal mechanisms for which it provides an un-
easy substitute.  Haley’s suggestion is that law provides not only a
substitute but a complement.  The oft-noted judge-made rules mini-
mizing the ability of Japanese landlords to evict tenants,33 employers
to fire workers,34 and private parties to break contracts, forcing par-
ties to negotiate, all serve to reinforce, not substitute for, private
29. J. Mark Ramseyer, Universal Health Insurance and the Effect of Cost Con-
tainment on Mortality Rates: Strokes and Heart Attacks in Japan, 6  J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009).  J. Mark Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal Health Insurance
on Malpractice Claims:  The Japanese Experience  ( Discussion Paper No. 648  (Sept.
2009)).
30. Robert B. Leflar, “Unnatural Deaths,” Criminal Sanctions and Medical Qual-
ity Improvements in Japan, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY LAW AND ETHICS 1 (2009).
31. Eric B. Feldman, Law, Society, and Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japan,
8 WASH. U. L.Q. 257 (2009).
32. Jacob Gersen & Eric Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STANFORD L. REV. 573 (2008); Richard McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudi-
cation, 2005 ILL. L. REV. 1043 (2005).
33. Curtis Milhaupt & Mark West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institu-
tional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime in Japan, 67 UNIV. CHICAGO L.
REV. 41 (2000).
34. Daniel Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in
the Service of Stability, 43 UCLA L. REV. 43 (1996).
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ordering.  This is a generalizable point hardly unique to Japan. Law,
we know, works through sanctions and incentives. But it works
through other mechanisms as well.  Sometimes, law without sanc-
tions can be effective simply by changing the structure of private
beliefs about others’ behavior, allowing people to coordinate their ac-
tions.35 Perhaps this theory can help to resolve the puzzle of
“Authority Without Power” in Japan: whether or not Japanese courts
have powerful sanctions available to them may be less important
than whether private parties rely on courts to help coordinate
behavior.36
There are several other worthy reasons to study Japanese law.
Japan is perhaps the world’s most legible state. This fact itself re-
sults from the remarkable success of the state-building enterprise.37
High quality statistics are available on everything from high end tax-
payers38 to the number of deaths from blowfish39 to the number of
yakuza members.40 The statistics are for the most part reliable.  Few
other societies even approach the amount of data collected by the
Japanese government.  This makes Japan a rich laboratory for test-
ing comparative theories.41
Though not the topic of Haley’s essay, one can add reasons why
the teaching of Japanese law is extraordinarily valuable. I would go
so far as to say that the debate triggered by John Haley’s 1974 chal-
lenge to Takeyoshi Kawashima belongs in every serious course on
comparative law.42  Haley’s debates with Mark Ramseyer about the
independence of the Japanese judiciary, briefly reviewed above, are
also illuminating. They force us to sharpen our conceptualization of
judicial independence and autonomy, and have spurred important ef-
forts to measure new institutions that will set the standard for other
such efforts.  The Japanese way of criminal justice provides an in-
structive counterpoint for American students used to our own
distinctively punitive approach.  Learning about Japanese institu-
tions may be helpful in many other ways, as well.  It goes without
35. McAdams, supra note 32.
36. JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER (1991).
37. JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998).
38. J. Mark Ramseyer et al., Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared:
Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns, 25 KOREAN ECON. REV. 5 (2009); J. Mark Ram-
seyer & Minoru Nakazato, Bidding for Ballplayers: A Research Note, 26 J JAPAN.  L.
85 (2008).
39. Mark West, Haley and the Blowfish, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES Q.
427 (2009).
40. Milhaupt & West, supra note 33.
41. Cf. Stephen Green,“Lies, Damned Lies, and Chinese Statistics,” FAR EASTERN
ECON. REV. (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/january/lies-
damned-lies-and-chinese-statistics.
42. John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 359
(Summer 1978).
\\server05\productn\C\COM\58-1\COM101.txt unknown Seq: 11 18-NOV-09 8:46
2010] STUDYING JAPANESE LAW BECAUSE IT’S THERE 25
saying that the teaching of these things presupposes a certain
amount of study.
Haley is surely correct that Japan has plenty to teach us. But to
return to the point made at the outset of this essay, one should not
neglect the non-instrumental reasons for studying Japanese law.  Ja-
pan is interesting in its own right and on its own terms, even if the
lessons it offers us turn out to be elusive.  Notwithstanding their dis-
ciplinary self-consciousness, most comparativists pursue their study
simply because of the inherent joy in learning about another legal
system. We might study Japanese law, as George Mallory famously
said about climbing Everest, because it is there.
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